Banking Reform Struggles On by Haynes, A.
 1 
 
Banking Reform Struggles On 
Andrew Haynes1 
Published in Statute Law Review, Oxford University Press. ISSN 0144-3593. 2014 doi 
10.1093/slr/hmu038 
Introduction 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 was passed as part of an ongoing process 
to improve the stability of the UK’s banking system. It does not sit in isolation but is part of a 
process that has involved the creation of the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial 
Conduct Authority and the adoption of the EU’s CRD IV which brings the Basel III banking 
regulations into EU law. The background for the statute’s content was Sir John Vickers’ 
Report2 into banking reform, published in September 2011, which led in turn in turn to the 
June 2012 White Paper3. At the same time the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards was examining accountability and corporate governance in the context of the 
LIBOR scandal as well as the issues of banking stability and competition4. 
However, the content and aims of the statute sit oddly with the causes and processes of the 
most recent banking crisis and had it existed at the time it is unlikely to have made much 
difference. This article will examine the aims and content of the Act and consider what its 
consequences are likely to be. 
The aims of the Act are to separate retail banking deposits from wholesale banking activities 
by 20195. to increase loss absorbency, and powers are granted to the PRA to facilitate this. 
Higher standards are imposed on bankers’ conduct by introducing a more stringent approval 
regime for senior managers and a new certificate regime is being brought in for those in 
“significant responsibility functions”. A criminal offence of reckless misconduct is created 
and depositors are given priority on a bank’s insolvency6. The Act itself also covers the bail 
in stabilisation option7, the conduct of people working in the industry8 and the regulation of 
both payment systems9 and infrastructure systems10. These will be examined in turn. 
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Ring Fencing 
Dealt with by the first part of the Act, this is the long standing matter of whether or not 
retail banks should be able to involve its depositors’ money in investment banking activities. 
The Act11 extends the PRA’s and FCA’s powers to making sure that the business of “ring 
fenced bodies” is carried on in a manner which safeguards its core business in the UK and 
which minimises the risk of it causing or becoming involved in systemic failure, though the 
powers do not extend to building societies12.  The Treasury13 is also given power to exercise 
their powers so as to minimise any adverse effect on competition. The Act14 also determines 
that deposit taking is a core activity and core services are those which relate to this. The 
Treasury has the power to extend the range of activities so defined and to determine15 that 
those holding investors’ deposits can deal as principal in investments and the range can be 
extended further having regard to the risks involved. There is however a critical limitation. It 
can only be done “if the Treasury are of the opinion that the making of the order is necessary 
or expedient for the purpose of protecting the continuity of the continuity of the provision in 
the United Kingdom of core services.” Conversely the Treasury can also impose limitations16 
for the same reasons. In either event appropriate rules can be passed. Interestingly, 
breaching the limitation on core activities is not an offence17, nor does it make contracts 
void or unenforceable18 though it will be treated as a contravention of the requirement. 
Ring fencing itself is not clearly dealt with in the statute but the PRA/ FCA will have the 
capacity19 to rule on shareholdings in other companies to maintain ring fencing. A 
remuneration policy can also be imposed for the same purpose. The Treasury can over-rule 
them and so has ultimate power in this regard20. 
Restructuring can be ordered if one of the following conditions is at issue. Core activities are 
being adversely affected by the activities of other members of the group; the ring fenced 
body is unable to make decisions independently of the rest of the group, or the ring fenced 
body is becoming dependant on resources provided by another member of the group which 
would not then be available in the event of another part of the group failing. Likewise, in the 
event of insolvency one or more other members of the group would be unable to continue; 
and the ring fenced body is engaging in an activity that breaches a PRA/ FCA regulatory 
objective. Orders can be given by both regulators to ring fenced firms and this includes21 
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discharging it from any liabilities22 and some or all of the business can be transferred to a 
third party. 
It is perhaps worrying that the requirement for the procedure should involve the regulator 
issuing a preliminary notice to the firm concerned and that they must be given a minimum 
of fourteen days in which they can make representations to that regulator23. This could 
prove a problem in a fast moving crisis. One recalls the three day delay in the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock caused by the Bank of England’s concerns over the impact 
of the market abuse laws, albeit mistakenly24. Presumably when the regulations themselves 
appear in a future statutory instrument there will be an emergency procedure available. 
Particular provisions exist to try and safeguard the firm’s occupational pension funds25. 
The Treasury can make orders regarding a ring fenced firm’s loss absorbency and require it 
to issue debt paper of a determined type. This is a fine idea in theory, but in practice who 
would buy such debt paper and what levels of interest would be needed to attract investors 
into lending to an institution that is in a survival threatening financial crisis? A state  
guarantee of the bank issuing the bond would obviously make a big difference but this 
would raise issues of EU competition law and it could be difficult to provide it quickly. In 
any event the specifics remain unclear26, although suggestions have been put forward in 
the PRA’s recent Consultation Paper27. 
It remains unclear as to how exactly banks will be split. The UK proposal differs from the old 
U.S. Glass Steagall Act28 which required a straight slit between retail and investment 
banking and the current Dodd Frank29 which separates proprietary trading from retail 
banking but which permits the latter to carry out market making. The forthcoming EU 
approach appears to require proprietary trading and market making to go into a separate 
company from retail banking, albeit within the same group. There is a vagueness here but 
also a degree of eccentricity. Deposit taking is stated to be a core activity in certain 
circumstances in the new draft statutory instrument. Likewise the definition of “excluded 
activities”30 is that of “dealing as principal” and largely replicates the definition that is used 
for financial services regulatory purposes in the Regulated Activities Order31. This does not 
sit very well with what most people would regard as non-core banking activities. It is not 
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totally irrelevant as it is partly drafted to protect clients’ money when being invested by 
either a fund manager in its own name, or if having loaned money to a client, an 
investment bank then invests in its own name. It does however look rather like the start of 
a stab at the issue rather than a coherent examination of it. 
Problems could also arise for SMEs in the form of higher costs who with their deposits in 
retail banks and the investment banks being uninterested in the scale of business most of 
them offer, will find themselves operating in a restricted environment. They could find the 
limited range of derivatives that are available from a retail bank failing to offer both the 
protection and opportunity they are seeking. They may also find a more restricted range of 
trade finance available32. Larger companies will probably resolve this problem by moving 
any deposit outside the retail bank to simplify their banking relations 
There may also be higher costs for the banks in terms of operating costs relative to 
operating profits, leaving the banks less profitable than they would otherwise be. There 
may be also less money to lend to normal banking clients. In addition there have been 
criticisms33 that the main statute should have gone into greater detail so that Parliament 
would be able to debate the issues more thoroughly, however it is probably better that 
matters proceed as they are doing so that rules relating to the banks can be drafted by 
subject specific experts. 
The Treasury has issued an Impact Statement34 to try and clarify how the ring fencing will 
operate. Tax issues are one potential problem as assets such as derivatives, some 
intangibles, possibly some loans and assets which in some cases might be assessable for 
capital gains tax will need to be moved from one company to another inside the overall 
banking group.  
Carrying forward past losses could also be an issue as the current tax regime only permits 
the carrying forward of past losses against the trade the losses occurred in. In some cases 
this may be easy to apply. For example losses resulting from a property backed 
securitisation could presumably see losses carried forward against either the lending book 
or as a loss on an off shore bond issue through an SPV and the loss end up one side the ring 
fence or the other. In practice a retail bank would only be left with the option of the 
former. However, where an investment bank has a choice the decision needs making up 
front and an educated guess made as to where it will be most profitable to carry forward 
the loss. The extent to which a loss remains be the “deferred tax asset” element, which sits 
on the bank’s balance sheet as an asset, and may need wholly or partly writing off, which 
has obvious potential capital adequacy implications.  
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VAT issues are not likely to prove a major problem. Most banking activities are not VAT 
able, and those that are (leasing, intangible, legal and accountancy support etc) represent a 
small part of the business. However, as the law currently stands there would be issues with 
ring fencing as the cross firm, intra group liability for claiming and recovering VAT 
presumably would not work across such a barrier and so any VAT would not be recoverable 
across them35.  
There should not be too many issues here, but if any insurmountable ones do appear there 
seems to be plenty of time spare for lobbying the Chancellor to amend the tax regime. The 
Treasury have already indicated that they will look at resolving any potential problems. 
Preferential debts and Depositor Preference 
Bank deposits are now deemed a preferential debt for insolvency purposes up to the 
amount covered at the time by the Investors’ Compensation Scheme36. This is slightly odd 
in that it appears to tread on part of the same ground as the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme. Depositor preference will place depositors on a preferential 
position over other creditors if a bank fails. This does not provide double protection as the 
depositors get back their money, up to the protected limit, but the first call will be to take 
the money from the failed institution to the exclusion of other creditors37 rather than the 
government. There is justification for this in that the cost is moved from the state to the 
bank’s creditors. The counter argument would be that the state is happy to make large 
profits from the taxation of banks and tax receipts from its employees when it is successful. 
Why should they not contribute if it fails?  
The limit for protection is £85,000 which may make sense, but what of someone handling 
an inheritance or moving house who might temporarily be in possession of a larger amount. 
This has now been approached as an issue by the PRA38 with a proposal that the Bank of 
England provides a higher level of depositor protection at £1 million where the funds 
concerned fall into a restricted range of circumstances. This will be for a period of between 
three and twelve months and cover “temporary high balances” relating to deposits from 
real estate transactions, those linked to events such as marriage, divorce, retirement, 
dismissal, redundancy and death and those relating to insurance pay outs and 
compensation. Many smaller businesses are also the sole or primary source of finance for 
its owners but unfortunately these would not be protected.  
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Bail in stabilisation 
To stabilise an institution the Treasury has the power39 to order the Bank of England to 
require a building society to be converted into a company and to transfer its business 
accordingly. In essence the proposal40 gives the authorities the capacity to shift potential 
losses from the depositors and creditors to the shareholders. Debts can also be cancelled. 
The question arises as to what part of a banking group’s activities should be covered by 
this. Will it be limited to converting debt and convertibles into equity or writing them off? 
The obvious danger is that it pushes up the cost to banks of raising capital and if debt paper 
is issued on the basis of potential convertibility part of the market may not take it up. 
Pension funds in many cases will be prohibited by their own investment requirements from 
being able to do so, even if their fund managers were interested in such an offer. The EU 
rules in the final version of the Recovery and Resolution Directive are still awaited and it 
may be worth considering whether to await them41. 
Conduct of Business of Financial Services employees 
There is a tightening up of the approval of senior categories of approved persons and a 
strengthening of the capacity to vary any approval42. “Misconduct” is specifically stated to 
cover a relevant person failing to comply with a PRA or FCA requirement43. There is a 
noticeable tightening of the responsibilities placed on senior people in banking and 
financial services institutions. This is an important area, albeit one that may take a long 
time to fully detail and put in place. “Senior management functions” will be defined by the 
PRA/ FCA and seem to be broadly determined to include anyone involved in decision 
making such as the head of business areas, senior managers of group entities and 
significant responsibility functions. This will cover non executives and could in certain 
circumstances potentially include in house legal advisers44 and senior people in parent 
companies where they have been involved in a subsidiary’s decision making process. It is 
perhaps positive that the regulator will require such people to have a “statement of 
responsibilities” setting out precisely what they will be doing, with particular regard to their 
management function. This process is already beginning. 
There is also a reverse burden of proof in general regulatory control involved in as much 
that senior managers will be presumed guilty of misconduct if their firm has broken the 
regulatory requirements. To defend themselves against this they need to be able to show 
that they took reasonable steps to stop the breach occurring. 
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Matters remain unclear, especially as there is further examination taking place this year of 
the functions of chief risk officer, head of compliance, head of internal audit and non- 
executive directors. Further developments are inevitable. 
Criminal sanctions 
There is a new criminal offence45 of making a decision that causes a financial institution to 
fail. It is widely defined in the sense that it states that a person “(i) takes, or agrees to the 
taking of, a decision by or on behalf of (the firm) as to the way in which the business of a 
group institution is to be carried on, or (ii) fails to take steps that (they) could take to 
prevent such a decision being taken.” The person must have been aware that there was a 
risk that the decision could affect the institution’s survival. The offence is punishable by up 
to 12 months46 and/ or a fine on summary conviction or up to 7 years and/ or a fine on 
indictment. Oddly insurers are excluded from this. 
There is a narrowness in the definition, the institution actually has to fail in as much that its 
survival is at issue. If this section is to have any possibility of working this needs to be 
defined to include the bank being nationalised, because being realistic that is what in 
extremis will happen if an institution looks as though it is going under. This is a result of the 
experience of BCCI’s failure, where large numbers of small businesses collapsed because 
they lost their overdraft facilities at short notice. Political expediency is another. There is a 
second narrowness in that the individual must engage in behaviour that falls “far below” 
that which would be expected. A qualification that seems to be designed to make sure that 
there is no reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution ever being brought! As this is an 
area of criminal law it is not surprising that the reverse burden of proof does not apply here 
as well. 
It also means that, if a case was brought, a judge or jury are going to have to determine, 
probably years after the event, whether or not the decisions made were reckless at the 
time. Matters may appear greatly different with hindsight and whilst part of the job of 
being a senior manager or director should involve a degree or prescience, omniscience is 
not really something they can be expected to provide. The potential criminal liability will 
tend to be difficult to determine. Northern Rock’s lending and securitisation policy was 
reckless and became increasingly so as it progressed, but would the directors have been 
found guilty had the new law applied? They could have pointed to the fact that the 
regulator had carried out a full stress test of the bank six months before it failed and 
deemed the approach adopted to be successful. The risk is that it will make bank directors 
defensive and unwilling to take sensible commercial risks. 
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On the other hand, is there really any appetite in the British establishment to actually take 
such steps? For example, looking back to the 2008 crisis. At the time the FSA (now FCA)  
Principle for Approved Persons read: 
“An approved person performing a significant influence function must exercise due skill, care 
and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which he is responsible in his 
accountable function.”47 
There cannot be any serious doubt that many of those on the boards of directors of the 
banks which failed in 2008 had failed this test completely. However, how many of them 
were fined under this provision? None. 
At the Royal Bank of Scotland group no-one was punished by the regulators for its overall 
failure. To quote from the FSA report: “RBS made a series of bad decisions…these bad 
decisions were not the result of a lack of integrity of any individual and we did not identify 
any instances of fraud or dishonest activity by RBS senior individuals or a failure of 
governance on the part of the board” 
This suggests that the FSA either did not understand their own rule book or wilfully affected 
no to. The disciplinary steps available were not limited to instances of a lack of integrity but 
a failure to perform their functions to an appropriate standard. No one expects other 
regulators, such as those responsible for solicitors, barristers and accountants to fail to take 
action unless there is evidence of “fraud or dishonest activity”. Where appropriate they will 
take steps for negligence, and what would be relevant here, for gross negligence. 
The FSA then cheerfully contradicted themselves by stating that “The competence of RBS 
individuals can, and will be taken into account in any future applications made by them to 
work at FSA regulated firms.” This suggests that there were serious doubts about the 
competence of the directors concerned. 
It should be added that there is an additional FCA Principle that has potential use in this 
context, namely Principle for approved Persons 5 which states that senior people 
“…must take reasonable steps to ensure the business of the firm for which he is responsible 
in his accountable function is organised so that it can be controlled effectively.”  
It is sometimes nicknamed the Barings Principle because the reason for Barings failure was 
the bank’s management’s incapacity to determine that the rogue traders’ activities were 
occurring at all, never mind threatening the bank’s survival until the bank actually started 
collapsing. There may have been scope for utilising this Principle given that the directors of 
all three key banking groups which failed in this country did not seem capable of 
understanding the risk their businesses were involved with in part due to their on 
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management structures, which stopped an understanding of risk reaching the board in an 
appropriate manner. At the three major banks that failed there was clearly a failure to get a 
clear understanding of risk to the top of the institution and that was in part a structural 
issue, even if personalities were sometimes an aggravating one. 
The only step against RBS seems to have been the ban on director John Cameron from 
working in banking. There seems to be strange discrepancy between this and the FSA’s 
fining of RBS the sum of £5.6m for failing to satisfy money laundering regulations. Compare 
this also with the FSA’s failure to take any action over the 2008 share issue where those who 
bought the shares later complained that they had not been told the truth about the 
situation at the bank. This potentially was potentially a criminal offence, amongst others, 
under the then applicable s.397 FSMA48 with a maximum sentence of seven years 
imprisonment. 
At HBOS Peter Cummings, the Head of Corporate Banking got a life time ban and a £500,000 
fine for “very serious misconduct” and the rest of the directors were let off despite the fact 
that the FSA’s own report stated that other senior people were involved in the same 
decisions. At Northern Rock David jones the Finance director was fined £320,000 and 
banned for misreporting mortgage arrears “which he knew to be false” and the ICAEW 
required him to pay £3,620 in costs after an investigation into him but did not add a fine because of 
the scale of the one the FSA had imposed. There were other steps against directors. Deputy 
Chief Executive David Baker was fined £504,000 for misreporting mortgage arrears and 
credit director Richard Barclay £104,000 for failing to ensure accurate financial information. 
Yet no other FSA steps were taken despite the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
reporting49 that “the (former) Directors of Northern rock were the principal authors of its difficulties.” 
The replacement directors of the bank refused to take negligence proceedings against the 
former directors on the grounds that “insufficient grounds for doing so.” Their wariness is 
more understandable. 
Where does this leave us? We are left with a regulator who will not take action where the 
consequences of acts are enormous unless they can show that there has been criminal 
misconduct despite the fact that their own rules give them power to act on a wider basis. 
What is troubling is that the regulator seems relaxed about adopting a different approach 
with smaller firms. Not maintaining sufficiently high standards repeatedly shows up as a 
basis for acting in such cases50. 
Perhaps though it reflects a deeper instinct, namely that if an issue appears to threaten an 
aspect the British establishment the matter is swept under the carpet as quickly as possible. 
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The extensive expenses scandal that hit the Houses of Commons and Lords was largely 
cleared up by requesting the money back and asking those responsible to apologise with 
prosecutions only being brought when people refused to. An arrangement many bank 
robbers would be happy to avail themselves of, but will never get the chance! 
 
Alternately, it may simply be an unwillingness to take on tough opposition and can be 
repeatedly seen in the past in relation to the regulator’s unwillingness (albeit the Bank of 
England in that case) to take steps against BCCI 15 years ago. There it was left to the 
Americans to force the closure of the bank and to take the necessary steps to try and 
extradite Hassan Abedi from Pakistan whilst the British did nothing, despite the fact that the 
banks de facto base of operations was in London. 
The previous major financial scandal prior to 2008 was the Lloyd’s of London crisis twenty 
years or so ago. A major scandal was dealt with by quietly doing very little and the 
perpetrators walked free. This being the prevalent establishment attitude it is difficult to see 
there ever being the political will to bring criminal prosecutions against bank directors in 
this country, regardless of the political party in power, unless they have engaged in 
transparently dishonest behaviour. 
Payment Systems Regulator 
The FCA has had to establish a payment systems regulator although it is not yet operating51. 
Its purpose is to regulate the payment systems which move money between individuals, 
businesses and government and in so doing it must promote competition and innovation 
and protect those whose money is being moved52. The new regulator does not cover cash 
settlement systems, securities or recognised clearing houses. There is a requirement that 
the regulators (the new Regulator, the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA) co-ordinate 
their functions53. As the Bank has the power to require the Regulator to refrain from 
specified action54 it is clearly going to function as more of a primus inter pares than was 
originally assumed by most observers when the new system was created last year. This is 
probably both necessary and inevitable. The PRA and FCA can also so require55 and as they 
sit beneath the Bank of England in terms of effective power a definable pecking order 
emerges.  
Special Administration for Operators of Certain Infrastructure Systems 
There is provision56 for a financial markets administration procedure to be created and the 
Bank of England is put in charge of it. It is primarily aimed at regulating inter-bank payment 
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systems. The Bank may ask for an administration order against such an entity by court 
order57 where it believes the entity is unable to pay its debts or is unlikely to be able to. 
Settlement risk will be reduced through participants being required to prefund their 
payments with cash held at the Bank of England58. 
Parent Undertakings 
The PRA and FCA have the power to require the parent undertaking of a ring fenced body to 
accept such rules as the regulator deems necessary for the purpose of ring fencing. It should 
be incorporated in or have a place of business in the UK. The Bank can require debt paper to 
be issued by the parent, though in those circumstances it is difficult to see who would buy it. 
The powers extend to subsidiaries.  The PRA and FCA must also meet the auditors at least 
once a year of UK based licensed Deposit takers. Insurers are treated differently.  
Ring fencing transfer schemes are provided for59 and also the key ingredients of 
stabilisation60. A key element is that bail in provisions made be made with regard to a 
specified bank and that can include the requirement that securities issued by that bank can 
be transferred to an administrator. Provision can also be made for the future ownership of 
the bank61.  
Other powers granted in this context include the crucial power to rearrange priorities 
between creditors by reference to the principles the Bank of England is meant to apply. The 
administrator can also draw up a business reorganisation plan for submission to the Bank. 
The administrator can also manage the bank’s business62. The Bank can remove bank 
directors, vary their contract of service or appoint a new one63. The Bank can also make a 
bail in of a bank. There are also provisions requiring the Treasury to direct any administrator 
as necessary where state aid is proposed. There is acknowledgement that this potentially 
breaches the provisions of Articles 107 or 108 of the Treaty of Rome. This would have to be 
factored in at the time the decisions were being made. 
Finally, secondary legislation has appeared in draft form64 but too much seems to have been 
left outside the ring fence when viewed from the vantage point of the banks inside. 
Concerns specifically relate to65 the limiting of trade financial services to the issuing of 
confirmation of documentary credits and guarantees, and the limitation of qualifying 
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instruments. With regard to the former it remains unclear at the time of writing66 whether  
banks can provide standby letters of credit, avalisation or bank SWIFT payment obligations. 
Also, to be eligible in the ring fenced banking sector contracts must be drawn up under UCP 
60067. This is not the case with standby letters of credit, Islamic trade finance and sovereign 
export credits, so problems arise in these areas. 
Will it work? 
There is still a great deal of uncertainty in what the precise make-up of the rules will be, 
especially with regard to ring fencing, which at least leaves the door open for future 
lobbying and decisions to be made on how and whether to tie the arrangements in with the 
forthcoming EU developments. There is a draft statutory instrument available68 but on the 
strength of that the details will be in PRA regulations rather than future statutory 
instruments, which is probably wise, especially when it becomes necessary from time to 
time to amend them.  
There is also the risk that banks could end up having to spilt into three parts with one 
satisfying the core activities, the second those activities the EU may regard as a core activity 
or equivalent which is outside the UK definition (or the other way round) and then the other 
activities in a third company. Thus there would be two ring fences not one. 
UK banks will find themselves with their ability to make profits squeezed and competing in 
the market place with overseas banks, many of whom do not have the same restrictions on 
their banking activities. The potential profits of the banking group will reduce through 
higher overheads and the banks concerned be driven to take greater risks to drive up 
profits. The exact opposite result than the one planned. 
Overall there is a bigger problem. The last banking crisis would still  have occurred had this 
Act already been in place at the time. The banks failed last time in this country through the 
excessive use of off shore securitised bond issues funding excessive mortgage lending 
(Northern Rock), reckless takeover activity (RBS) and excessive lending, poor risk control and 
inadequate liquidity (HBOS). Separating retail from investment banking was not really the 
issue, despite the repeated calls from politicians to protect retail banks from what they 
describe as “casino” banks as the solution to the problem. The remainder of the proposals in 
the Act are essentially beneficial but which cannot pretend to be solutions to the problem of 
potential banking failure. 
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